STPA
(System-Theoretic Process Analysis)
| | Overview
We apply System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), a systems-theoretic hazard analysis method, to identify system-level hazards and potential causes of accidents in nuclear, railway, industrial control and complex hardware-software integrated systems.
Unlike traditional methods such as FTA and FMEA, which mainly focus on component failures and their effects, STPA examines hazards arising from system control structures, interactions between components and unsafe control actions, even when no component failure occurs.
We model the system Control Structure, identify Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs) and Loss Scenarios, and derive Safety Constraints and Safety Requirements. The results support hazard management and safety assurance throughout system development, from early design through implementation and verification.
| | Major Subjects
-
STAMP Theory (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes)
Application of systems-theoretic accident models to hazard analysis based on hierarchical control
structures and safety constraints. Assessment of hazard mechanisms arising from system interactions and
inadequate control.
-
STPA Four-Step Process
Definition of analysis objectives, system-level losses and hazards, modelling of control structures,
identification of Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs), analysis of loss scenarios, and derivation of safety
requirements.
-
Unsafe Control Action (UCA) Analysis
Identification of unsafe control actions based on four categories: Not Providing, Providing When Unsafe,
Incorrect Timing or Order, and Incorrect Duration.
-
Loss Scenario Analysis
Identification of potential loss scenarios involving control algorithm and process model errors, inadequate
feedback, control command transmission or execution failures, system interactions, and changes in
operating conditions.
-
STPA-Based Test Case Identification and Derivation
Derivation of system and software test cases from UCAs, loss scenarios and safety constraints.
Identification of normal, abnormal and boundary test conditions considering control contexts and system
operating states. Definition of test inputs, execution procedures and expected results, with traceability
between hazards, safety requirements and test cases.

| | Analysis Methods and Applicable Standards
-
STAMP Theory (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes)
Application of systems-theoretic accident models to hazard analysis based on hierarchical control
structures and safety constraints. Assessment of hazard mechanisms arising from system interactions and
inadequate control.
-
STPA Four-Step Process
Definition of analysis objectives, system-level losses and hazards, modelling of control structures,
identification of Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs), analysis of loss scenarios, and derivation of safety
requirements.
-
Unsafe Control Action (UCA) Analysis
Identification of unsafe control actions based on four categories: Not Providing, Providing When Unsafe,
Incorrect Timing or Order, and Incorrect Duration.
-
Loss Scenario Analysis
Identification of potential loss scenarios involving control algorithm and process model errors, inadequate
feedback, control command transmission or execution failures, system interactions, and changes in
operating conditions.
-
Integration with Traditional Hazard Analysis
Cross-review of STPA results with FTA, FMEA and HAZOP analyses. Complementary assessment of
hazards arising from component failures and system interactions, including evaluation of the consistency
and completeness of safety analysis results.
-
International Standards and Guidelines
Application of analysis procedures based on the MIT STPA Handbook (2018) and SAE J3307:2025
(System-Theoretic Process Analysis Standard for All Industries). Alignment with safety lifecycle and hazard
management requirements under applicable standards, including IEC 61508, IEC 62278 and IEC 62425.
-
Reference: STPA Handbook (2018), Nancy G. Leveson et al.

| | Key Deliverables
-
STPA Hazard Analysis Report
Definition of system analysis scope and operating environment, lists of losses and hazards, results of each
STPA step, safety constraints, and assessment of key loss scenarios.
-
System Control Structure Model
Hierarchical control structure diagrams, definitions of controllers, controlled processes and major
components, and documentation of control actions, feedback, process models and interface relationships.
-
Unsafe Control Action (UCA) Analysis Report
Identification and classification of UCAs for each control action, associated system states and hazardous
conditions, and traceability to hazards and safety constraints.